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FEDERAL TAXATION OF NORTH CAROLINA
TRUSTS FOR UNBORN AND UNASCERTAINED
BENEFICIARIES
CHARLES L. B. LOWNDES*
Ordinarily a trust, even a gratuitous trust, is irrevocable unless a
power of revocation has been reserved.' The rigor of this rule is
mitigated to some extent by the doctrine that a trust may be terminated
by the action of all the beneficiaries where this does not violate a mate-
rial purpose of the trust;2 or, even if such a purpose is violated, by the
concurrent consent of the settlor and the beneficiaries.3 The termination
of a trust by the action of the beneficiaries, or that of both beneficiaries
and settlor, requires, however, not only that the interested parties be
capable of giving a legally effective consent, but that they be in esse
and ascertained. 4 Where beneficiaries are not in being or are not
ascertained and a power of revocation has not been explicitly reserved,
there is virtually no way to terminate a trust.5
In North Carolina, however, the legislature has made provision for
this situation. Under Section 996 of the Code, where a trust is created
for the benefit of the settlor or some other person in being and unborn
or unascertained persons, the interest given to the unborn or unascer-
tained beneficiaries may be revoked by the settlor alone, if the trust is
gratuitous; or by the settlor and the person who furnished the con-
sideration, if the trust was created for a consideration. Section 996
makes similar provision for conveyances of future interests in real
estate to unborn persons apart from any trust.
Although the basic idea underlying Section 996 is sound, in the
absence of clarification on the part of the legislature it may prove a
source of unanticipated embarrassment to people who have created
trusts under the North Carolina laws. It is possible that Section 996
may be construed to prevent the creation of an irrevocable trust for
unborn or unascertained beneficiaries. This is a possibility pregnant
* Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law.
'RESTATEMiENT, TRUSTS (1935) §330(2).
" REsTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) §337.
'RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) §338.
'RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) §340.
'A court may, however, order the termination of the trust where an emergency
has arisen which threatens the destruction of the trust property, unless the trust
is terminated. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) §336. Also, of course, where the
execution of the trust was induced by fraud, duress, undue ififluence or mistake
it may be rescinded, RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) §333, and if a power to revoke
the trust was omitted by mistake the settlor can have the trust instrument re-
formed and revoke the trust. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) §332.
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with potentialities of heavy penalties under the federal estate, gift and
income taxes.
The federal estate, gift and income taxes are closely connected. They
have a good many related characteristics. An important conception
common to all three is their treatment of revocable transactions. As
Mr. Justice Holmes pointed out, modern federal taxes are "not so much
concerned with the refinements of title as ... with actual command over
the property taxed-the actual benefit for which a tax is paid.' 6  Even
though a person has parted with title to property, if he retains power
to recall the transfer, the federal estate, gift and income taxes disregard
the transaction and treat it as though it had never occurred. Thus, for
example, a man is regarded as the continuing owner of property con-
veyed by way of a revocable trust, so that it is taxed to his estate under
the federal estate tax upon his death, 7 and the income from the property
is taxed to him under the federal income tax during his life.8  By a
parallel principle he will not be regarded as having made a taxable gift
of the property under the federal gift tax, at least, until he relinquishes
his right of revocation.9 The details of the definitions of a revocable
trust differ for purposes of the federal estate, gift and income taxes.
Under all three, however, it makes an important difference whether a
trust is revocable or irrevocable. It is quite possible, moreover, that
the definitions of a revocable trust under all three taxes are sufficiently'
broad to catch a trust within the scope of Section 996.
(1) THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX
A concrete hypothesis may serve to focus the problem more clearly.
Suppose that A conveys property to B in trust for C for life, with a
remainder to C's unborn children. The trust is governed by North
Carolina law. A intended that the trust should be irrevocable so he did
not put in a provision reserving a power of revocation. To clarify the
preliminary consideration of the problem, moreover, assume that A did
not see any necessity for stipulating that the trust should be irrevocable,
so there is no explicit provision concerning the revocation of the trust
at all. It will be simpler to consider the effect of the federal estate, gift
and income taxes separately, so the first question is whether at A's
death the trust property will be taxed as part of his gross estate under
the federal estate tax.
Assuming that the trust was not created in contemplation of death,
the only provision under which it can be reached is that taxing revocable
6 Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U. S. 376, 378, 74 L. ed. 916, 917, 50 S. Ct. 336 (1930).
INT. REv. CODE §811(d) (1939). 1 INT. REv. CODE §166 (1939).
'Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U. S. 280, 77 L. ed. 748, 53 S. Ct. 369 (1933);
Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U. S. 39, 84 L. ed. 20, 60 S. Ct. 51 (1939);
Rasquin v. Humphreys, 308 U. S. 54, 84 L. ed. 77, 60 S. Ct. 60 (1939).
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trusts. The federal estate tax imposes a tax upon a trust where the
settlor alone or "in conjunction with any other person" has at his death
a power "to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate" the trust.'0 There is a
further provision that the tax shall apply "without regard to when or
from what source the decedent acquired such power" or in what capacity
the power is exercisable. 1 This is a broad provision and it has been
construed broadly. Thus, for example, the Supreme Court has held
that the tax applies even though the trust in question can only be re-
voked by the settlor in conjunction with a person having a substantial
adverse interest in the trust.'
2
Upon a casual inspection of the provisions of the federal estate tax
taxing revocable trusts it would appear that the trust in the hypothetical
case is taxable to A's estate, at least to the extent of the value of the
remainder in favor of the unborn children. Although A may not have
intended to create a revocable trust, it is revocable under Section 996
of the North Carolina Code. This would be true even if the trust ante-
dated the passage of the Code provision. Section 996 applies to trusts
created before as well as after the passage of that section, and the
retroactive aspect of this provision has been held constitutional.' 3 Even
assuming that the trust were created for a consideration, so that it could
only be revoked with the concurrence of the person furnishing the con-
sideration, it would still be revocable under the federal estate tax, which
defines a revocable trust as one which can be revoked by the settlor
alone or the settlor in conjunction with any other person, including a
person who has a substantial adverse interest in the trust.'
4
It is possible, moreover, that not only the value of the remainder
interest in the hypothetical trust will be taxed to A's estate, but that
the entire trust, that is, the value of the property transferred in trust,
will be so taxed. A can revoke the entire trust with the consent of the
beneficiary in being, which means that he can revoke it without the con-
sent of all those beneficially interested in it, and it is arguable that this
makes the trust taxable to his estate in its entirety. Obviously there are
two ways of looking at the trust. It may be viewed as a single trust
which can be revoked with the consent of some, but not all, of the per-
sons interested in it. From this angle it is a single revocable trust
taxable in its entirety to A's estate.15 On the other hand, it is possible
1°INT. REv. CODE §811(d) (1939). 111d. §811(d) (1).-2Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U. S. 85, 80 L. ed. 62, 56
S. Ct. 70 (1935).
13 Stanback v. Citizens National Bank of Raleigh, 197 N. C. 292, 148 S. E. 313
(1929).
" Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U. S. 85, 80 L. ed. 62, 56
S. Ct. 70 (1935).
" Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U. S. 85, 80 L. ed. 62, 56
S. Ct. 70 (1935) ; Virginia L. Houghteling et aL, Ex'rs, 40 B. T. A. 507 (1939).
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to regard the trust as really in substance two trusts: an irrevocable trust
for the beneficiary in being, which is not taxable to A's estate, and a
revocable trust for the unborn beneficiaries, which is taxable to A's
estate. From this point of view only the value of the remainder would
be included in the grantor's gross estate for purposes of the federal
estate tax.16 The second point of view is strengthened if we start from
the premise that what A did in the hypothetical case was to create an
irrevocable trust. Then Section 996 fastened upon the trust and made
the remainder revocable. It did not, however, touch the interest of
the beneficiary in being, with the result that there is still an irrevocable
trust for the beneficiary in being, but a revocable trust of the remainder.
This is less persuasive when one considers the countervailing argument
in favor of the first view. Suppose that in a state which has no statute
similar to Section 996 A conveys property in trust for C for life, re-
mainder to C's unborn children. A explicitly reserves a power to revoke
the trust with the consent of C. The entire trust, not merely the value
of the remainder, is taxed to A's estate under the federal estate tax.'
7
Yet in this situation A has actually given up more during his life than
in the case of a trust revocable because of Section 996. During his life
A deprived himself of power to recall C's interest without C's consent.
He also has deprived himself of the power to recall the interest of the
unborn children without C's consent. Where the trust is revocable be-
cause of Section 996, however, the settlor has only given up the power
to recall the interest of the life beneficiary without the life beneficiary's
consent. He has power to revoke the interest of the remainderman without
the life beneficiary's concurrence. In the latter situation, he has actually
parted with less than in the former. It would seem to follow, therefore,
that he should not be taxed upon less at his death. The conclusion, of
course, is that from the point of view of the federal estate tax there is no
difference between the two trusts and a trust revocable only because of
Section 996 is taxable in its entirety to the settlor's estate. There appears
to be no authority precisely in point. Although it is impossible to make
any accurate forecast of what will happen, it should be borne in mind
that if a trust is revocable under Section 996 there is a substantial
chance that not only the value of the revocable remainder but that of
the irrevocable estate for the beneficiary in being will be taxed as part
of the grantor's gross estate under the federal estate tax.'
8
"8 Cf. the dissenting opinion of L. Hand, J., in Commissioner v. City Bank
Farmers Trust Co., 74 F. (2d) 242, 246, 247 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
17 Supra note 15.
IS It has been held, however, that where there is a transfer to a trust under
which the transferor has no power to revoke the interest of the life beneficiary,
hut can revoke the interests of the remaindermen, there is a taxable gift only to
the extent of the life interest. Emery May Holden Norweb, 41 B. T. A. 179
(1940). That is, the trust for purposes of the federal gift tax is irrevocable as
1942]
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There is a bare possibility that A's estate may not be taxable in the
hypothetical case even upon the remainder of the unborn children. It
is not, however, much more than a bare possibility. In Helvering v.
Helmholg,19 the Supreme Court decided that a trust was not taxable
under the federal estate tax merely because of a provision by which it
could be revoked with the consent of all the parties interested in the
trust. Helvering v. Helmholg has been variously interpreted. Accord-
ing to a recent writer the Court held that a formal reservation of a
power of revocation will not make a trust taxable under the federal
estate tax "when the reservation of such right adds nothing to the power
given under local law." 20  If this interpretation is sound, it would fol-
low that a trust which is revocable because of some rule of law rather
than a formal reservation in the trust instrument is not a revocable trust
under the federal estate tax, and that a trust which is revocable solely
because of Section 996 is not taxable.
It is exceedingly doubtful, however, whether Helvering v. Helmholz
stands for any such broad proposition. The lower federal courts have
held that the question of whether a trust is revocable under the federal
gift and estate taxes is not affected by whether the power to revoke
originates in a formal reservation of the trust instrument or some rule
of the local law. Commissioner v. Allen,21 for example, involved the
federal gift tax. A minor created a trust two days before the 1932
gift tax was passed. Under the applicable New Jersey law this gift
was voidable during the donor's minority. The Commissioner contended
that there was a taxable gift upon the theory that the gift was not made
when the trust was created before the enactment of the gift tax, but
when the donor reached majority and lost her power to disaffirm after
the tax had been passed. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, in sustaining the Commissioner's contention, said that for pur-
poses of the federal gift tax there is no distinction "between a settlor's
power to revoke when imposed by law and a settlor's like power when
reserved by his trust indenture." 22 The same result has been reached
under the federal estate tax. Under the law of Louisiana a gift by one
spouse to the other is revocable although no power of revocation is
far as the life beneficiary is concerned and revocable as to the remainders. In the
light of the recent attempt of the Supreme Court to correlate the estate and gift
taxes (Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U. S. 39, 84 L. ed. 20, 60 S. Ct.
51 (1939) and Rasquin v. Humphreys, 308 U. S. 54, 84 L. ed. 77, 60 S. Ct. 60
(1939)) it might be argued that the same view of the trust should be taken under
the federal estate tax, and that only the value of the remainders should be taxed
to the settlor's estate." 296 U. S. 93, 80 L. ed. 76, 56 S. Ct. 68 (1935).
2 0 
SHocxEY, FEDERAL TAxATION FOR THE LAWYER (1941) 76.
21 108 F. (2d) 961 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939).
22 1d. at 965.
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formally reserved.23  The Board of Tax Appeals24 and the Circuit
Court of Appeals2 5 have held recently that such gifts are taxable to the
estate of a deceased spouse as revocable transfers. Both tribunals de-
clared upon the authority of Commissioner v. Allen26 that a transfer
revocable because of a formal reservation of a power to revoke and one
which is revocable because of a rule of law stand upon the same footing.
Helvering v. HehnholZ27 was distinguished upon the ground that the
Supreme Court held that the trust in the Helmholz case was not taxable
because the power to terminate it was conferred in explicit terms upon the
beneficiaries of the trust and the settlor acquired this power by virtue of
the accidental circumstance that she was a beneficiary, rather than in her
capacity of settlor. This distinction is of dubious authenticity. That does
not mean, however, that the doctrine enunciated by the Allen,
28 Keiffer 2 9
and Howard30 cases is necessarily erroneous. In fact the conclusion
reached in those cases to the effect that there is no distinction for
federal tax purposes between a trust revocable because of a formal
reservation of a power of revocation and because of some rule of the
local law seems eminently sound and sensible.
Although the circumstances that the settlor acquired her power to
revoke the trust in the Helnholz case 3 ' as a beneficiary may have been
a makeweight in the decision, a careful reading of the case will disclose
that the principal ground upon which the Court relied was the fact that
the power of revocation reserved by the trust instrument was merely a
power to revoke with the consent of all those interested in the trust.
This interpretation of the case makes it necessary to face squarely the
question which Commissioner v. Allen 32 and the decisions following
that case 38 sidestepped. Does Helvering v. Helmholz stand for the
broad proposition that a power to revoke a trust which is based upon a
rule of the local law rather than a formal reservation in the trust instru-
ment will not make the trust taxable under the federal estate tax? One
of the best ways to define the implications of a decision is to examine
their practical operation. A rule that a trust shall not be treated as
revocable unless the right to revocation originates in a formal reserva-
. LA. CIv. CODE (Dart, 1932) art. 1749.
24 Estate of Felicie Gumbel Keiffer, 44 B. T. A. No. 198 (1941).
"r Howard v. United States. Alexander. 1942 Fed. Tax Serv., 20,408 (C. C. A.
5th, 1942) ; see Note (1942) 55 HARv. L. Rav. 684.
108 F. (2d) 961 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939).
27296 U. S. 93, 80 L. ed. 76, 56 S. Ct. 68 (1935).
2' Commissioner v. Allen, 108 F. (2d) 961 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939).
9 Estate of Felicie Gumbel Keiffer, 44 B. T. A. No. 1.98 (1941).
"o Howard v. United States, Alexander, 1942 Fed. Tax Serv., 20,408 (C. C. A.
5th, 1942) ; see Note (1942) 55 HARV. L. REv. 684.2 Helvering v. Helmholz, 296 U. S. 93, 80 L. ed. 76, 56 S. Ct. 68 (1935).
22108 F. (2d) 961 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939).
"Estate of Felicie Gumbel Keiffer, 44 B. T. A. No. 198 (1941); Howard v.
United States, 40 F. Supp. 697 (E. D. La. 1941).
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tion in the trust instrument would lead to absurd results. For example,
if a husband were to make a gift to his wife in North Carolina and
provide that this should be revocable, he would clearly be taxable upon
this gift under the federal estate tax. But a man in Louisiana could
make exactly the same sort of gift and escape any liability under that
statute.3 4  It is true that there are some situations where liability for
federal taxes is determined by conflicting rules of local law. This occurs
for instance in the taxation of community income under the federal
income tax.3 5 It also occurs in connection with the taxation of income
from an alimony trust, where the federal income tax liability of the
husband who creates such a trust depends upon whether it is possible
under the local state law to completely discharge any future liability to
the wife by the creation of the trust.36 In the cases where liability for
federal taxes is contingent upon local law, however, the local law
actually makes a difference in the taxpayer's rights and liabilities. Hus-
bands and wives in community property states have different rights
with respect to each other's earnings than spouses in other states. An
alimony trust which completely discharges any future obligation of the
settlor to his divorced wife is a legally distinct thing from a trust
which does not discharge this obligation. Although it may be question-
able whether these legal differences are sufficiently substantial to justify
distinct federal tax treatment,37 the fact remains that there are differ-
ences. There is not even a legal difference, however, between a trust
which can be revoked because of the formal reservation of an explicit
power of revocation and one which can be revoked because of some
quirk of local state law. Both powers derive their ultimate sanction
from rules of law-either a rule which recognizes the validity of a
formal reservation of a power of revocation, or a rule making a trust
revocable directly. There is no distinction here upon which to base a
different federal tax treatment.
Conceding that practical considerations preclude construing Helver-
ing v. Helnholz&8 as a broad mandate to the effect that a trust will not
" Ibid. By Section 2280 of the CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE (Deering, 1937) it is
provided, "Unless expressly made irrevocable by the instrument creating the trust,
every voluntary trust shall be revocable by the trustor by writing filed with the
trustee." If the proper interpretation of Helvering v. Helmholz, 296 U. S. 93,
80 L. ed. 76, 56 S. Ct. 68 (1935) were that a trust revocable because of a rule
of law is not a revocable trust under the federal estate tax, trusts could be created
in California which would not be subject to the federal estate tax, although similar
trusts in other states would be subject to quite different federal tax treatment.
It seems doubtful, to say the least, whether Helvering v. Helmholz will be con-
strued to require any such footless discrimination.
" Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U. S. 101, 75 L. ed. 239, 51 S. Ct. 58 (1930).
" Helvering v. Fuller, 310 U. S. 69, 84 L. ed. 1082, 60 S. Ct. 784 (1940).
"'See Lowndes, Taxation of Community Income and Alinony (1942) 20
TAXES 3.296 U. S. 93, 80 L. ed. 76, 56 S. Ct. 68 (1935).
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be treated as a revocable trust for purposes of the federal estate tax
merely because it is revocable because of some local rule of law, the
question remains, what does the decision stand for? The chances are
that it stands for just what the Court decided in the case-that a trust
which can only be revoked with the consent of the interested parties is
not a revocable trust within the purview of the federal estate tax. This
is, of course, eminently sensible. Such a trust is no more revocable
than any absolute gift which can be recalled with the connivance of the
donee. It is true that in Helvering v. Helmholz the power of revoca-
tion which the settlor had formally reserved happened to concur with
what the Court took to be the rule of the local law where no power to
revoke was reserved. Although the Court commented upon this fact,
it seems to have been an accidental circumstance, rather than a determin-
ing factor in the decision. Trying to view Helvering v. Helmholz not
so much through the eyes of the Court which decided it, as through
those of later courts who may be called upon to interpret it, a fair con-
struction of the case seems to be that a trust will not be revocable for
estate tax purposes where it can only be revoked by the consent of all
those interested in the trust.
From this point of view Helvering v. Helmholz affords no obstacle
to the taxation of a trust for unborn or unascertained beneficiaries which
is revocable under Section 996 of the North Carolina Code, since the
obvious purpose of that section is to admit of revocation of the trust
without the consent of those beneficiaries. Although the distinction of
the Helmholz case by the lower federal tribunals in the cases which
repudiated any difference for federal tax purposes between a trust rev-
ocable because of a formal reservation in the trust instrument and one
revocable by rule of law is quite dubious, the conclusions reached in
those cases appear entirely sound. A trust which is revocable because
of Section 996 of the North Carolina Code seems to be taxable under
the federal estate tax.
It is, of course, also possible to contend that the 1936 amendment
to the provisions of the federal estate tax taxing revocable trusts ex-
pressly abolished any distinction between a trust revocable because of
the formal reservation of a power of revocation and one revocable
because of a rule of law which may have been suggested by Helvering
v. Helmholz. This amendment, which was passed after that decision,
provides that a trust shall be deemed revocable where there is a power
to revoke "without regard to when or from what source the decedent
acquired" the power and without regard to the capacity in which it is
"exercisable." 39  Although the literal reach of the language is broad
" INT. REV. CODE §811(d) (1) (1939).
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enough to embrace a trust revocable because of a rule of law, it is
doubtful whether it is properly applicable to such a situation. The
legislative history of the amendment discloses that it was not passed to
deal with the problem of a trust revocable by a rule of law, but to
nullify the effect of the Supreme Court's decision in White v. Poor"0
where it was held that a trust which the settlor could revoke in her
capacity as a trustee rather than in her role of a settlor was not taxable
under the federal estate tax. From a practical point of view, the diffi-
culty with applying the 1936 amendment to trusts revocable by rule of
law is that the amendment is purely prospective and this, therefore,
affords a basis for arguing that such a trust created prior to the enact-
ment of the amendment is not taxable. When this argument was made
in Estate of Keiffer,41 the Board disposed of it by saying that to the
extent that it applies to trusts revocable by rule of law it is simply
declaratory of the pre-existing law.
The discussion up to this point has been premised upon a trust for
unborn or unascertained beneficiaries where the trust instrument did
not expressly provide that the trust should be irrevocable. Such a trust
is clearly revocable under Section 996 of the North Carolina Code and
it would appear to be taxable under the federal estate tax. Suppose,
however, that a trust for unborn or unascertained beneficiaries contains
an explicit provision to the effect that it shall be irrevocable. What
effect will this have upon liability under the federal estate tax? The
answer to this question hinges upon whether it is possible to create an
irrevocable trust for unborn or unascertained beneficiaries in North
Carolina in view of Section 996. Upon this point there appears to be
no controlling authority. The competing considerations which will have
to be weighed in this connection are, however, fairly clear.
If the purpose of Section 996 is simply to confer upon the creator of
a trust for unborn or unascertained beneficiaries a personal privilege of
revoking the trust and involves no particular question of policy, it
would seem that this privilege could be waived by the creator of such
a trust and that an irrevocable trust for unborn or unascertained bene-
ficiaries could be created, despite Section 996, by an explicit provision
to that effect. It might be difficult to find such a waiver in the case
of a trust created prior to the enactment of Section 996 since a person
cannot usually waive a right which he does not know about and it would
appear even harder to find a waiver of a right which did not even exist.
If, moreover, no explicit provision for irrevocability were inserted in a
trust for unborn or unascertained beneficiaries at the time the trust was
created, there might be some difficulty, if an attempt to waive the privi-
4 296 U. S. 98, 80 L. ed. 80, 56 S. Ct. 66 (1935).
" 44 B. T. A. No. 198 (1941).
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lege of revocation were made later, to find consideration to sustain the
waiver, assuming this to be necessary. However, if Section 996 merely
confers a personal privilege which can be waived, this certainly clarifies
the tax problems raised by that section.
One of the grave difficulties with Section 996 as it stands at present,
however, is that it is very doubtful whether it expresses a personal
privilege which can be waived or a public policy of the state which it
would be illegal to try to waive. It is interesting, although not unduly
significant, to observe in this connection that an eminent authority on
trusts, in writing in praise of the North Carolina statute, apparently
regards it as expressive of the public policy of the state against tying
up property irrevocably in favor of persons who may never be born or
ascertained.42  Apparently the only North Carolina case which has
raised this problem is Cutter v. American Trust Co.43 In that case the
lower court held that a provision that a trust should be irrevocable did
not prevent modification of the trust under Section 996. Unfortunately
for our present purposes, however, the appellate court upheld the modi-
fication of the trust upon another ground and expressly refused to con-
sider the effect of Section 996.
It may or may not be significant that, although Section 996 says
that the settlor of a trust for unborn or unascertained beneficiaries ?my
revoke their interests, which looks a little like the language of privilege,
no distinction is made with respect to trusts which are explicitly pro-
vided to be irrevocable. As far as the literal reach of the language of
the section is concerned it covers all trusts for unborn and unascertained
beneficiaries regardless of what explicit provisions are made about revo-
cation. It might be argued, moreover, that if the statute were intended
merely to confer a personal privilege upon the settlors of such trusts
to revoke them rather than to express the public policy of the state, the
legislature took a curious way of achieving this result. Prior to the
statute the grantor of a trust for unborn or unascertained beneficiaries
had the privilege of making their interests revocable by an explicit pro-
vision to this effect. If Section 996 was simply designed to reverse the
ordinary presumption that a trust which fails to stipulate explicitly for
revocation is irrevocable, why did the legislature stop with trusts for
unborn and unascertained beneficiaries? Why, moreover, did not the
legislature express itself in these terms instead of laying down a flat
rule that all trusts for unborn and unascertained beneficiaries should be
revocable?
It is at least arguable that Section 996 makes it impossible to create
an irrevocable trust for unborn or unascertained beneficiaries in North
423 Scorr, TRuSTS (1939) §340.
"213 N. C. 686, 197 S. E. 542 (1938).
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Carolina. If this is true it has serious implications in connection with
the federal estate tax. It may also have an important bearing upon
liability for the federal income and gift taxes. Before taking up the
question of what remedial legislation should be enacted in connection
with Section 996 it will be well to consider these taxes.
(2) THE FEDERAL INcomE TAx
A trust within the purview of Section 996 should not ordinarily
present any, serious problem in connection with the federal income tax.
Normally the trustee will be directed to pay the income from the trust
to the settlor, or to some other beneficiary in being, during the life of
the settlor or that of the beneficiary in being, and to distribute the trust
property to the unborn or unascertained beneficiaries, who presumably
will be born or ascertained by this time, at the death of the income
beneficiary. If the income from the trust is paid to the settlor, it will
be taxed to -him."4 If it is paid to another beneficiary in being it will
be taxed to this beneficiary45 save for a rare situation where because
of some intimate tie-up between the beneficiary and the settlor the bene-
ficiary is not regarded as having a substantial adverse interest in the
trust,46 or the income from the trust is used to discharge an obligation
of the settlor.47 In other words, even though there is a trust for unborn
or unascertained beneficiaries, Section 996 will not create any difficulties
in connection with the federal income tax, if these beneficiaries have no
interest in the income from the trust.
47 a
Conceivably, however, the unborn or unascertained beneficiaries may
have an interest in the income of a trust. Thus, suppose for example,
that A conveys property to B in trust to pay one half of the income to
C during C's life and to accumulate the residue of the income for C's
unborn children. Assuming further that the trust was gratuitous and
that there is no provision in the trust instrument making it irrevocable,
the interest of the unborn beneficiaries is dearly within A's unfettered
power to recall under Section 996. How will the income from the trust
be taxed under the federal income tax?
The income which is distributable to C is, of course, taxable to C.
The rest of the inbome, however, would appear to be taxable to A. 48
It is true that the federal income tax defines a revocable trust differently
than the federal estate tax. A trust is not revocable under the federal
" INT. REV. CODE §162(b) (1939). "Ibid.
,1 Fulham v. Commissioner, 110 F. (2d) 916 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940).
,' Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U. S. 1, 80 L. ed. 3, 56 S. Ct. 59 (1935).
41^ If there are capital gains, however, which are added to corpus, rather than
distributed currently as income, it might be argued that these are taxable to the
settlor of the trust because of his power to revoke the remainder.
"I INT. R~v. CODE §166 (1939).
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income tax if the settlor cannot revoke it without the concurrence of a
person having a substantial adverse interest in the trust.49 If, however,
part of the trust may be recalled without such consent, the income from
this portion of the trust is taxable to the settlor.50 In the hypothetical
case A cannot revoke the entire trust without C's consent. He may,
however, revoke the interest of the unborn beneficiaries without anyone's
consent. He is, therefore, apparently taxable upon the income which
is to be accumulated for these beneficiaries.
There is, moreover, another ground upon which A appears to be
taxable in this case. Under the federal income tax, income from a trust
which may be accumulated for or distributed to the settlor of the trust
in the discretion of the settlor alone, or the settlor and a person who has
no substantial adverse interest in the trust, or a person lacking such an
interest alone, is taxable to the settlor.51  Inasmuch as A may revoke
the interest of the unborn beneficiaries under Section 996 and possess
himself not only of their remainder interest in the principal of the trust
but the accumulated income as well, it would seem that the income is
taxable to him as income distributable to him in his discretion. Even if
the trustee in the hypothetical case were not directed to accumulate half
of the income from the trust for the unborn 'beneficiaries, but was
merely authorized to do so, it would seem that this part of the income
would be taxable to the settlor, A, as income which could be accumu-
lated for him in the discretion of the trustee, a person lacking a sub-
stantial adverse interest in the trust.
52
The extent to which these results would be different if the trust in
the hypothetical case had been created for a consideration is not entirely
clear. If the person furnishing the consideration were also a beneficiary
of the trust, presumably none of the income from the trust would be
taxed to the settlor, because he would not be able to revoke any part of
the trust nor reach any of the accumulated income without the concur-
rence of a person having a substantial adverse interest in" the trust. If,
however, the person furnishing the consideration were not a beneficiary
under the trust, then whether or not the income to be accumulated under
the trust would be taxable to the settlor would depend upon whether
the person furnishing the consideration could fairly be said to have a
substantial adverse interest in the trust.
53
'9 Ibid.
coIbid. INr. Rrv. Cona §167 (1939).
Reinecke v. Smith, 289 U. S. 172, 77 L. ed. 1109, 53 S. Ct. 570 (1933).
"' It has been held that where a trust is created for a child, a parent who has
the duty of supporting the child has a "substantial adverse interest" in the trust,
although the parent was not named directly as a beneficiary of the trust. Raoul
H. Fleischman, 40 B. T. A. 672 (1939); Freda R. Caspersen, 40 B. T. A. 759
(1939).
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The conclusion that income which is to be accumulated for unborn
or unascertained beneficiaries under a North Carolina trust is taxable
to the settlor because of Section 996 of the North Carolina Code is, of
course, posited upon the proposition that the federal income tax makes
no distinction between a trust which is revocable because of a formal
reservation of a power of revocation and one revocable because of a
rule of law. It has been held with seeming reason that this distinction
is not material as far as the federal gift54 and estateP5 taxes are con-
cerned. There is no manifest reason why it should make any particular
difference in connection with the federal income tax.
It is possible that an irrevocable trust for unborn or unascertained
beneficiaries may be created in North Carolina despite Section 996 by an
explicit provision for irrevocability. If this is true, and it is by no means
clear that it is, then income accumulated for such beneficiaries under an
irrevocable trust for their benefit should be taxable to the trustee rather
than to the settlor of the trust. The problem here, of course, is that
discussed earlier of whether Section 996 expresses a personal privilege
which the settlor of a trust for unborn or unascertained beneficiaries
may waive, or an inflexible rule of public policy., 6 There is no ad-
vantage to be gained by repeating the earlier discussion of this point.
(3) THE FEDERAL GIFT TAX
A taxable gift is not made under the federal gift tax when a rev-
ocable trust is created. The taxable transfer takes place only upon
the relinquishment of the power of revocation.57 Applied to a North
Carolina trust for unborn or unascertained beneficiaries this means that
where such a trust is created by way of a gift there may be considerable
difficulty in determining when liability for the federal gift tax accrues.
Going back to the case with which this discussion started, suppose
that A gratuitously conveys property to B in trust for C for life, re-
mainder to C's unborn children. The trust instrument is silent as to
whether the trust is revocable or irrevocable. A cannot revoke C's life
estate. To this extent it would seem that he has made a taxable gift.58
Under Section 996 of the North Carolina Code, however, A may divest
the unborn beneficiaries of their remainder interests. It would appear,
' Commissioner v. Allen, 108 F. (2d) 961 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939).
5 Estate of Felicie Gumbel Keiffer, 44 B. T. A. No. 198 (1941); Howard v.
United States, Alexander, 1942 Fed. Tax Serv., 20,408 (C. C. A. 5th, 1942).
'o Supra pp. 286-287.57 Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U. S. 280, 77 L. ed. 748, 53 S. Ct. 369 (1933) ;
Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U. S. 39, 84 L. ed. 20, 60 S. Ct. 51 (1939) ;




therefore, that there will be no taxable gift of the remainder until the
interest of the remaindermen vests and becomes irrevocable.5 9
A possible argument might be made to the effect that A made a.
taxable gift of the entire trust property at the time he created the trust.
Unlike the federal estate and income taxes the federal gift tax contains
no explicit definition of a revocable trust. It is not clear whether a
trust which can only be revoked with the consent of a substantial adverse
interest is to be treated as a revocable trust under the gift tax as it is
under the estate tax, or as an irrevocable trust as it is under the income
tax. The present position of the Regulations6 is that such a trust is an
irrevocable trust, which means, of course, that a taxable gift occurs
when the trust is created. Assuming in the hypothetical case that C's
interest in the trust is both substantial and adverse, it might be argued
that this is a trust which can only be revoked with the consent of a sub-
stantial adverse interest and that a gift of the property embraced in the
trust occurs when it is created.
It seems reasonably clear, however, that when the Regulations say
that a trust which can only be revoked by the concurrence of a person
having a substantial adverse interest is an irrevocable trust, they have
in mind a situation where no portion of the trust can be revoked without
such concurrence. If, for example, the interest of the unborn bene-
ficiaries could not be recalled without C's consent in the hypothetical
case, then for gift tax purposes the entire trust would be irrevocable
and its creation taxable under the gift tax. Where, however, part of a
trust can be revoked without anyone's consent, which is the situation
with respect to the interest of the unborn beneficiaries in the hypo-
thetical case, it would seem that to this extent there is a revocable
transfer which is not taxable as a gift under the federal gift tax.6 '
These conclusions are premised, of course, upon the assumption that
for gift tax purposes there is no distinction between a trust revocable
by rule of law and one revocable because of a formal reservation of a
power of revocation.6 2 The discussion has also proceeded upon the
assumption of a hypothetical situation where there was no express pro-
vision for irrevocability. If by explicit provision a trust for unborn or
unascertained beneficiaries can be made irrevocable despite Section 996,
a taxable gift for purposes of the federal gift tax will occur when such
a trust is created. If, however, as seems not at all unlikely, Section 996
expresses a principle of public policy which cannot be waived, the trust
50 Ibd.
s0 Regs. 79, Art. 3 (1936) as amended by T. D. 5010 (1940).
01Emery May Holden Norweb, 41 B. T. A. 179 (1940).
12 Commissioner v. Allen, 108 F. (2d) 961 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939).
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will remain revocable despite explicit provision against revocation and
there will be no taxable gift when it is created.
3
CONCLUSION
Section 996 of the North Carolina Code constitutes a serious tax
hazard for persons who have created or who are about to create trusts
for unborn or unascertained beneficiaries under the laws-of North Caro-
lina. If the proper construction of that section is that it confers merely
a personal privilege of revoking such trusts, which may be waived by an
explicit provision against revocation, it is, of course, possible to create
irrevocable trusts for unborn and unascertained beneficiaries in North
Carolina just like it is in other states. By careful planning North
Carolinians may undertake such trusts without encountering any heavier
federal tax burdens than citizens of other states. If, however, Section
996 expresses a rule of public policy which makes it impossible to
create an irrevocable trust for unborn or unascertained beneficiaries,
it does a serious injustice to people who wish to create such trusts under
the laws of this state. Either they must resign themselves to heavy
federal tax burdens or they must go abroad and seek to bring their
transactions under the more favorable laws of some other jurisdiction.
It is clear that the desirable construction of Section 996 in view of
the federal tax situation is that it creates a personal privilege rather
than that it expresses an inflexible rule of public policy. It is not at
all clear, however, whether this is a permissible construction under the
broad language of that section or the one which will finally be adopted
by the North Carolina courts. Even though Section 996 may eventually
be construed as conferring merely a defeasible privilege, until this ques-
tion is finally settled there will be a period of acute uncertainty during
which the conscientious lawyer can do little more than advise his clients
who wish to create a trust for unborn or unascertained beneficiaries to
try to create them under the law of some other state. He may even
feel obliged to counsel the revocation of such trusts which have already
been created in North Carolina and their reconstitution under the laws
of some other jurisdiction.
Trusts in North Carolina should not be subjected to these hazards.
Section 996 should be amended to provide that it shall not apply to a
trust which is explicitly declared to be irrevocable. Of course, even this
amendment will not fully meet the unfortunate situation which Section
996 has created. It will take care of future cases, but it will not meet
the very legitimate necessities of trusts created before the amendment is
passed. A good many trusts for unborn and unascertained beneficiaries
" Spra p. 287.
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have been created in North Carolina with an explicit provision against
revocation in the confident expectation that the settlors would be re-
lieved from any future tax liability.
These cases can be partly cared for by providing a simple statutory
procedure by which the settlor of a trust for unborn or unascertained
beneficiaries may release his power of revoking the trust. Even this,
however, will not take care of the cases where due to the death or other
incapacity of the settlor this is no longer possible. Conceivably such
situations might be met by amending the statute to provide that a trust
for unborn or unascertained beneficiaries, which was explicitly declared
to be irrevocable, shall be irrevocable, regardless of whether the trust
was created before or, after the passage of the amendment.
This is a just solution, but a nice question may arise as to its con-
stitutionality. Of course, there will be no problem if the North Carolina
Supreme Court construes the statute in its. present form as creating a
mere privilege of revocation which may be waived by explicit provision
against revocation. Assuming, however, that the Court construes the
statute as stating a rule of policy which cannot be waived, then the ques-
tion will arise as to whether the retroactive operation of the amendment
does not unconstitutionally deprive the settlor of a trust for unborn or
unascertained beneficiaries of a vested right. It is true that in Stanback
v. Citizens National Bank of Raleigh64 it was held that Section 996 ap-
plied to trusts for unborn and unascertained beneficiaries created before
as well as after the passage of that statute. The retroactive operation of
Section 996 was, moreover, held to be constitutional. If Section 996 may
be applied retroactively to convert an irrevocable trust for unborn or
unascertained beneficiaries into a revocable trust, it might seem to fol-
low that the proposed amendment could be applied retroactively to con-
vert a revocable trust into an irrevocable trust. This does not, however,
follow from the reasoning in the Stanback case. The Court there said
that an irrevocable trust for unborn or unascertained beneficiaries could
be converted into a revocable trust because the contingent expectancies
of the beneficiaries were not protected by the constitution. There is a
strong intimation that vested rights could not be treated in the same way.
Unless it is possible to say that the power of revocation conferred upon
the settlor of a trust for unborn or unascertained beneficiaries is not a
vested right protected by the constitution, the retroactive operation of
the proposed amendment would appear to be clearly unconstitutional,
e, 197 N. C. 292, 148 S. E. 313 (1929).
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